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Abstract
Health researchers and health policy advocates have proposed levying excise taxes on snack foods as a
possible way to address the growing prevalence of obesity and overweight in the United States. Some
proposals suggest higher prices alone will change consumers' diets. Others claim that change will be
possible if earmarked taxes are used to fund an information program. This research examines the
potential impact of excise taxes on snack foods, using baseline data from a household survey of food
purchases. To illustrate likely impacts, we examine how much salty snack purchases might be reduced
under varying excise tax rates and possible consumer price responses. We find that relatively low tax
rates of 1 cent per pound and 1 percent of value would not appreciably alter consumption—and, thus,
would have little effect on diet quality or health outcomes—but would generate $40-$100 million in
tax revenues.
Keywords: Obesity, excise tax, price elasticity of demand, snack food
Introduction
The prevalence of obesity for Americans age 20-74 rose from 15 percent in the late 1970s to 23.3 per-
cent in the late 1980s and to 30.9 percent in 1999-2000 (Flegal et al., 2002).1 Increases occurred for
both men and women in all age groups. Similar increases occurred for the share of the population that
is overweight, but not so fat as to be labeled obese. Also, the prevalence of overweight children has
been rising (Ogden et al., 2002).2 Overweight children often become overweight adults, and there is
reason to believe the trend toward overweight and obesity among all Americans may continue.
Whether the high and rising prevalence of overweight and obesity is a public or private health problem
is a contentious issue. Many in the public health community say overweight and obesity are public
health problems because so many people suffer from chronic diseases associated with these conditions.
Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 747-08 August 2004
1 In population studies, it is common to classify adults as obese, overweight, healthy weight, or underweight. Such classification
uses a measure known as body mass index (BMI), calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. Indi-
viduals are classified as obese when their BMI is greater than or equal to 30. Individuals are classified as overweight, but not
obese, when their BMI is greater than or equal to 25, but less than 30. Healthy weight is less than 25, and greater than or equal
to 18.5. Underweight is less than 18.5.
2 Children are not classified as obese. Instead, categories are denoted overweight and at risk of being overweight. Body mass
index cutoffs for both categories vary with age and gender.ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE
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They argue that these problems pose as large a threat of morbidity as poverty, smoking, or
problem drinking (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001). This conclu-
sion is leading public health officials to search for new ideas for programs designed to
influence diet, exercise, and other weight-reducing lifestyle choices.
Conversely, Epstein (2003) argues that public health interventions should be directed at
communicable diseases and pollution, problems partly caused by individuals making
choices without accounting for the cost they impose on others. Obesity is not a communi-
cable disease; one person’s diet and lifestyle choices do not put others at greater risk of
obesity. There are no noncommunicable epidemics. So, Epstein concludes that obesity
does not warrant public sector resources. Further, interventions intended to mitigate
obesity’s adverse effects are likely to have unintended effects that compromise public
health. When the public sector expands, individual wealth has to contract, leaving indi-
viduals less able to make choices that reduce their health risks and less able to pay for
new medical and risk-reducing technologies. The impact may be to reduce incentives
for research and development in health sciences.
Despite the possibility that any intervention designed to reduce the prevalence of obe-
sity might reduce economic efficiency, there is no shortage of ideas for ways govern-
ment could intervene to influence diet and lifestyle choices, including an excise tax on
snack foods. The various proposals to tax snack foods are not all alike. They all aim to
reduce consumption of snack foods, but differ substantially on the mechanism through
which taxes will achieve that goal.
In this short paper we cannot resolve whether obesity and overweight are best left to
individual diet and lifestyle decisions or whether economic efficiency is more likely
advanced through public sector programs. We can, however, bring together informa-
tion on consumer food choices and responsiveness to price changes and use that infor-
mation to suggest whether taxes alone could change consumers’ diet quality and
health. First, we identify characteristics and goals of four snack tax proposals. Then,
we use the ACNielsen Homescan panel data to examine likely impacts of taxes on
consumers’ dietary choices. (See box, “ACNielsen Homescan Panel Data.”)
The range of snack foods is large. To keep our discussion to a manageable size, we
illustrate points by focusing only on salty snack foods.
To establish a baseline for analysis, we tabulated quantities of salty snack foods pur-
chased by different types of households. Associated household demographic character-
istics allow us to identify systematic differences in snack food demand among house-
hold types. We use the baseline to forecast the immediate impacts of taxes. There are
two sources of uncertainty in such forecasting: namely the size of the tax and con-
sumer response to a price increase. Currently, there is no information suggesting that a
tax of any size is likely. Without any likely limits to impose on the problem, we exam-
ine impacts of a range of taxes, from putatively small to coercively large. We have
some information that suggests consumers are not likely to substantially cut back their
purchases of snack foods in response to retail price increases. Thus, we examine a
range of responses to taxes, but limit the range to proportionately small responses.
No tax proposal is sufficiently detailed for an analyst to precisely identify its burden
or whether it raises equity issues. However, our data allow us to show that a relatively
small ad valorem tax (an excise tax imposed as a specific percentage or tax rate rather
than a per unit tax) would not immediately change consumers’ diets, but would raise
tax revenues. 
What Has the Public Health Community Said 
About Taxing Snack Foods?
Battle and Brownell (1996) proposed four policy changes to combat obesity, including
taxes on unhealthful foods and subsidies for healthy foods. They also argued for
restricting food advertising and possibly eliminating advertising of candy, soft drinks,
fast foods, and sugared cereal aimed at children, as well as providing more bicycle
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raise tax revenues.paths and recreation centers to encourage physical activity. Although they did not specify
a tax level, their purpose in manipulating food prices was to create an incentive for con-
sumers to increase consumption of “healthy” foods and decrease consumption of
“unhealthy” foods (p. 762).
Nestle (2002) listed five classes of changes in public policies intended to promote better
diet and lifestyle choices: education reforms, food labeling and advertising reforms,
health care and training requirements, transportation and urban development require-
ments, and taxes. Taxes include the following: 
“Levy city, state, or federal taxes on soft drinks and other ‘junk’foods to fund ‘eat less,
move more’campaigns. Subsidize the costs of fruits and vegetables, perhaps by raising
the costs of selected foods of minimal nutritional value” (p. 367).
Nestle did not specify a tax level nor exactly define the foods that she would tax. Her
proposal is similar to that of Battle and Brownell in that the tax is intended to raise
snack food prices and lower fruit and vegetable prices, creating an incentive for con-
sumers to substitute fruit and vegetables for snack foods in their diets. But Nestle’s tax
proposal is also intended to raise revenues to fund an information program.
Marshall (2000) proposed (for the United Kingdom) extending the value-added tax (17.5
percent) to particular foodstuffs he considered culpable in raising serum cholesterol lev-
els—those high in saturated fats—and to exempt from taxation those foods currently
taxed that are cholesterol neutral. He argued that this new selective tax would provide
incentives both for consumers to change their diets and for manufacturers to reformulate
foods. For example, he would tax whole milk but not skim milk.
“Biscuits, buns, cakes and pastries, puddings, and ice cream could be taxed if they raised
cholesterol concentrations but exempt if the ratio of polyunsaturates to saturates (and trans
fatty acids) were more favourable” (p. 303).
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ACNielsen Homescan Panel Data 
This report uses a unique data set, the ACNielsen Homescan panel, a nationwide
panel of households that scanned their food purchases (from all retail outlets) at
home. Data included detailed product characteristics, quantity, and expenditures for
each food item purchased by each household. The data are unique in that they
include detailed purchase information as well as demographic information about the
households in the panel.
We used the random-weight panel, which is a subset of the full panel (12,000
households). Households in the subset scanned both fixed-weight products (prod-
ucts with a universal product code, or UPC) and random-weight products (e.g.,
meat and poultry, fruit and vegetables). From this set, we drew data from house-
holds that were in the panel for at least 10 out of the 12 months in 1999—7,195
households. Our sample is projectable to the U.S. universe of product purchases.
The data set is a stratified random sample. The sample was selected based on both
demographic and geographic targets. Stratification was done to ensure that the sam-
ple matches the U.S. Census. The household was the primary sampling unit and
there was no intentional clustering. The weight assigned to each household reflects
the demographic distribution within strata.
We calculated quantity-weighted average prices each household paid for various types
of salty snack foods in a year by summing household expenditures for the entire year
for each type of snack food and dividing by quantity purchased over the year. The
average annual prices we calculate account for promotions and coupon use.4
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While his proposal was intended to reduce the incidence of ischemic heart disease, med-
ical associations in England and Australia have more recently considered similar taxes
to combat obesity.
Jacobson and Brownell (2000) countered Marshall’s proposal by arguing that legisla-
tors would prefer to establish tax rates for entire classes of foods, like snack foods,
rather than taxing an attribute like saturated fat levels in foods. They proposed a tax of
1 cent per 12-ounce soft drink and 1 cent per pound of candy, chips, and other snack
foods, or fats and oils. Their plan depends on demand being unresponsive to price
changes as they would earmark taxes to fund information campaigns.
Proponents of snack food taxes have voiced a variety of goals. Not all the goals can be
realized, at least immediately. For example, if a snack foods tax was passed on to con-
sumers in the form of higher retail prices, and consumers were very responsive to
changes in snack food prices, consumers might abandon snack foods. In that case,
there would be no tax revenue for funding an information campaign. From the tax pro-
ponents’ perspective, this situation would have a desirable aspect: Consumers would
be purchasing and, presumably, consuming fewer snacks. The undesirable aspect
would be that there would be no money to try to inform consumers how they ought to
eat. So, the desirable aspect would last only as long as the tax; removing the tax would
remove the incentive to economize on snacks.
Alternatively, if consumers simply paid the tax without altering their snack food con-
sumption, diet quality would be unchanged, snack food manufacturers’ sales and rev-
enues would be unchanged, and there would be no incentive for manufacturers to
reformulate their products. There would, however, be tax revenues that could be ear-
marked for an information program. Suppose that the point of an information program
is to change consumers’ preferences, making snack foods less desirable. If such a pro-
gram were successful, consumers would become less willing to purchase snacks. That is,
at each price at which snacks might be sold, consumers would choose less. But that suc-
cess would reduce tax revenues. So, if the information program resulted in a permanent
change in consumer preferences, the program’s budget would contract along with the
demand for snacks.
Linking a shrinking program budget with program success, however, is opposite to the
way organizations, private or public sector, usually operate. Usually, a division of a
private sector company that increases profits or a public sector agency that provides
additional public services soon receives larger budgets, additional staff, and more
responsibility. The challenge for an information program lies in finding a way to use
dwindling tax funds effectively. 
Whether there will be tax revenue available or whether the tax (absent an information
program) will change consumers’ diets depends on how big an incentive the tax is for
consumers. The incentive effects will depend on the tax base (which foods are taxed)
and the tax rate, and how important those foods are to consumers—namely the extent
to which consumers will modify their dietary choices to escape the tax. If consumers
consider the tax a trifle, or if there are no untaxed foods consumers could substitute for
snack foods, there will be few or no dietary changes.
Who Purchases Snack Foods and 
How Much Do They Purchase?
While salty snacks are a subset of all snack foods, focusing attention on this class of
snack food is sufficient to show three points. First, snack food consumption is nearly
universal, so almost all households will bear some burden for a tax that raises snack
food prices. Second, descriptive statistics show that there are systematic differences
among consumers, with both quantity purchased and expenditures following demo-
graphic and household characteristic lines. Third, despite the variance in quantities
purchased and expenditures, this class of snack foods appears to be a relatively small
expenditure for all types of households.This latter finding suggests that snack food demands will not respond very much to
tax-induced price changes. If consumers pay more attention to taxes on large expendi-
tures than on small expenditures, we could expect that consumers will treat a small ad
valorem tax as a trifle.
Almost everyone purchases some snack foods. Data show that over the course of a
year, about 91 percent of households purchased potato chips (table 1). On average,
households that did purchase potato chips purchased 9.8 pounds yearly and spent
about $26. Examining a somewhat wider class of snacks—all chips (potato, corn, and
tortilla)—shows an even larger share of households (about 96 percent) that purchased
snacks. There are other salty snacks besides chips: pretzels, cheese puffs, microwave
popcorn, and nuts (packaged and bulk). These snacks were purchased by 96.8 percent
of households. Considering all salty snacks, 99 percent of households purchased some,
on average spending $76 yearly on 31.8 pounds. The per capita quantity purchased
was 14.5 pounds.
Of course, not all households are average. Figure 1 shows the distribution of house-
hold consumption of all salty snacks in 1999. Each bar represents the percentage of
households for which annual purchases of all salty snacks fell in a particular 2-pound
interval, say 8-10 pounds. The modal (most typical) purchase level is 10-12 pounds.
The distribution is skewed as the modal purchase level falls below the average. The
long right tail of the distribution shows that a small fraction of households purchase
relatively large quantities. At ever-diminishing levels, the tail extends far beyond what
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Table 1—Salty snack consumption and expenditures, 1999
Snacks Share of  Average quantity Per capita Average 
households purchased by quantity expenditures by
that  households that did purchased by households that 
purchased purchase households that did purchase 
snacks (pounds) did purchase 
(percent) (pounds)
Potato chips 91.3 9.76 4.18 $26.14
All chips 95.5 16.34 7.00 $41.43
Other salty snacks 96.8 16.47 7.92 $37.41
All salty snacks 99.2 31.81 14.47 $76.39
Source: Tabulations from ACNielsen Homescan panel, 1999.
Figure 1
Percentage
Percentages of households purchasing salty snacks, 
by quantity, 1999





















































Poundsis reported in figure 1. The rightmost bar (0.37 percent of households) represents all
households purchasing 150 pounds or more.
Although almost all households purchase salty snacks, there are systematic differences
in expenditures and quantities purchased among households with different socioeco-
nomic characteristics.
Household size
There is a strong relationship between salty snack quantities purchased and household
size—larger households purchase more than smaller households (fig. 2). However, per
capita quantities purchased decrease with household size, indicating that household con-
sumption does increase with household size, but at a decreasing rate. This pattern of
purchases is explained by figure 3. We tabulated quantities purchased by households
with children age 6 and above (denoted as households with children3) and all other
households. Salty snack purchases in households with children (45.1 pounds) are 60
percent higher than households without children (28.1 pounds). However, in per capita
terms, households with children consume 32 percent less than those without children. In
effect, households usually increase in size by adding children and children eat less salty
snack foods than adults.
Race and ethnicity
Panel households were asked to identify their race and ethnicity. We used those
responses to classify households into four broad categories: non-Hispanic White, non-
Hispanic Black, Hispanic, and Asian.4 Race/ethnicity is associated with expenditures
and quantities purchased of snack foods. Non-Hispanic White households purchased
the largest quantity of salty snacks, followed by Hispanic and Asian households,
respectively (fig. 4). Non-Hispanic Black households purchased the lowest quantity of
all salty snack foods. In per capita terms, the order differs. Hispanic households pur-
chased less than Asian households. This difference may reflect family size choices
rather than differences in food preferences. Hispanic households in the sample tended
to have larger families (3.3) than Asian households (2.4).
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Household and per capita quantities of salty snacks
purchased, by household size, 1999
Pounds
Household size
Source: Tabulations from ACNielsen Homescan panel, 1999.
Per capita
Household
3Panel households indicated whether they had
children in any of three categories: less than 6
years of age, 6-12 years of age, or 13-18 years
of age. For the purpose of distinguishing
households with and without snack-eating
children, we selected the 6-12 and 13-18 years
of age categories to represent households with
children. The less than 6 years of age category
clearly includes some very young children
who would not be eating salty snack foods.Household income
Panel members were asked to identify household income by selecting one of 16
income ranges.5 In Figure 5, we identify the midpoint of each range and, for each
income range, show household and per capita quantities purchased of all salty snacks.
While quantity purchased increases with income, per capita quantity purchased is not
associated with income. Similarly, household expenditures on salty snacks increase
with income; there appears to be at most a weak relationship between per capita expen-
ditures and income (fig. 6). Per capita quantity purchased and expenditures peak at an
income level of $37,500.
Although there is a systematic variation in snack food consumption and expenditures by
household size, race/ethnicity, income, and other socioeconomic factors, expenditures on
snack foods constitute a very small fraction of household income. For example, for the
income group with the highest per capita expenditures on snack foods ($37,500), house-
hold and per capita expenditures on all snacks are 0.2 and 0.1 percent of income, respec-
tively. For the income group with the highest household expenditures on snacks
($80,000), household expenditures on snacks are 0.1 percent of the household income.
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Household and per capita quantities of salty snacks purchased, 
by households with and without children, 1999











Household and per capita quantities of salty snacks purchased, 
by race/ethnicity, 1999










      Black
Household Per capita
5Respondents were offered 16 ranges, e.g.,
under $5,000, $5,000-$7,999, $8,000-$9,999,
$100,000 and over. We treated each observa-
tion as the midpoint of the range, with the
upper range identified as $100,000.Simulating Diet, Health Outcome, and Tax Revenue Impacts
Taxes might or might not influence dietary choices. The magnitude of the influence
depends on the size of the tax, how difficult it would be for resources used in manufactur-
ing and distributing snacks to move to an untaxed sector, and how responsive consumer
demands are to taxes. For simplicity and illustrative purposes, we suppose the entire tax is
passed forward to consumers. The impacts on quantity of snacks purchased, (and thus on
consumer diets) and tax revenues depends on consumer responsiveness to prices (includ-
ing taxes) and the size of the tax.
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Figure 6
Household and per capita expenditures 
on salty snacks, by income group, 1999
Dollars
Source: Tabulations from ACNielsen Homescan panel, 1999. 
Household income ($ thousand)










Household and per capita quantities of 
salty snacks purchased, by income group, 1999
Pounds








Household income ($ thousand)
Household
9 13.5 22.5 32.5 42.5 55 80
Per capitaTable 2 shows the calculated effects of different tax rates for different measures of con-
sumer responsiveness to prices. Price elasticity of demand—percentage change in quantity
demanded per percentage change in price—takes three levels. We examine the possibility
that quantity demanded is very unresponsive to price changes (very inelastic
demand—price elasticity of demand = -0.2); quantity demanded responds less than pro-
portionately to price changes (inelastic demand—price elasticity of demand = -0.7); and
quantity demanded responds equiproportionately to price changes (unitary elastic
demand—price elasticity of demand = -1.0).6 We examine 4 possible ad valorem tax
rates: 0.4, 1, 10, and 30 percent. The first is nearly equivalent to the Jacobson and
Brownell proposal of a 1-cent-per-pound tax. Thus, we examine 12 possibilities for tax
rates and consumer price responsiveness.
We use baseline information from the panel on average annual price paid and average
per capita quantity purchased across the entire year for each of the 12 cases. Assuming
that all purchases are consumed and that other foods would not be substituted for salty
snacks allows us to calculate changes in caloric intake (although probably overesti-
mated). We assume salty snacks average 150 calories per ounce.7 And, at 3,500 calo-
ries per pound of body weight (American Dietetic Association, 2003), we can calculate
tax-induced reductions in body weight (again, probably overestimated). Data on per
capita expenditures on salty snack foods, price elasticity of demand, and tax rates are
sufficient to calculate taxes paid by each individual. We use the U.S. Census popula-
tion estimate to calculate total tax revenue collected.
Table 2 shows that salty snack consumption decreases as the tax rate and price elastic-
ity of demand increase, exactly as expected. For the two lowest tax rates of 0.4 and 1
percent, calculated reductions in annual purchases are negligible, ranging from 0.19
ounce per year to 2.32 ounces per year, depending on the elasticity assumption. Even
when we consider impacts on the relatively small number of households purchasing
extremely large quantities—say five times the average quantity (see figure 1), scaling
up all the tax impacts by a factor of five—the tax from these two rates amounts to
$0.70-$1.75 per person per year.
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6Our own research points to elasticity esti-
mates ranging from -0.2 to -0.7. See, “Taxing
Snack Foods: Manipulating Diet Quality or
Financing Information Programs?” forthcom-
ing in Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol.
27, No. 1, Spring 2005.
7Most chips are labeled as 150 calories per
ounce. Peanuts are labeled as 165 calories per
ounce and other nuts labeled higher. Pretzels
and microwave popcorn are around 110 calo-
ries per ounce, but can carry more calories.
Table 2—Tax-induced reductions in annual quantity purchased and taxes collected for various price
elasticity and tax rate assumptions 
Tax rate Reduction in  Reduction in Reduction in body Tax paid U.S. total tax




0.4 0.19 28 0.01 0.14 40.8
1.0 0.46 69 0.02 0.35 101.9
10.0 4.63 695 0.20 3.44 1,000.6
30.0 13.89 2084 0.60 9.90 2,879.3
Inelastic demand
(-0.7)
0.4 0.65 97 0.03 0.14 40.7
1.0 1.62 243 0.07 0.35 101.4
10.0 16.21 2431 0.69 3.27 949.6




0.4 0.93 139 0.04 0.14 40.7
1.0 2.32 347 0.10 0.35 101.1
10.0 23.15 3473 0.99 3.16 918.9
30.0 69.45 10418 2.98 7.37 2,144.2
Source: Economic Research Service/USDA.For the two lowest elasticity assumptions and the two lowest tax rates, calories and body
weight reductions are close to zero. The calorie and body weight impacts are likely over-
estimated because we assumed the tax would be entirely passed forward to consumers.
We can conclude that, for these cases, taxes would not appreciably alter diet quality or
health outcomes. The cases do suggest that tax revenues would, however, be
positive—approximately $40 million per year for the 1 cent per pound tax (0.4 percent)
and $100 million for the 1-percent tax. 
At higher tax rates (10, 30 percent), impacts are likely overestimated. When taxes increase
to 10 or even 30 percent and the effective price the consumer pays increases, other foods
may begin to look more attractive. That is, an inelastic demand is unlikely to be very
inelastic over a wide range of price increases. Consumers might substitute untaxed foods
for snack foods, leaving average taxes paid and total taxes collected smaller than
estimated in table 2. Further, if consumers substitute untaxed foods for taxed snack foods,
the reductions in calories consumed and body weight will also be overestimated.
Conclusion
The public health and economic efficiency approaches to choosing a role for govern-
ment often reach opposite conclusions. From the public health perspective, the poten-
tial for illness or injury is sufficient to justify government action; large numbers of
deaths or illnesses are more compelling reasons for government action. The dollar
value of benefits and costs derived from government programs does not necessarily
enter the public health decision calculus. Alternatively, economic efficiency demands
that proposed government programs clear two hurdles. First, there must be an effi-
ciency problem for government to solve. Second, a corrective program must be worth
the cost.
So far, economists have not reached a consensus on whether obesity raises economic
efficiency problems. If obesity results from informed individuals’ willingly making
diet and lifestyle choices, there is no way to argue for inefficiency; we have to con-
clude that many are willing to accept extra weight because the cost of diet and exercise
is too high. On the other hand, arguments for intervention could be mounted on the
basis of imperfect information about the relationship between diet and health. Never-
theless, many in the public health community have proposed interventions, and taxing
snack foods has been advocated frequently. But, without a clear statement of the effi-
ciency problem caused by overweight and obesity, we cannot say whether such taxes
might increase or decrease economic efficiency—i.e., whether benefits exceed costs.
Our calculations suggest that imposing taxes on the order of 1 cent per pound—as sug-
gested in the literature—is unlikely to have much influence on consumer diet quality
or health. Despite not knowing exactly how consumers might respond to higher prices
for salty snacks, we did show that relatively lower tax rates imply a very narrow range
for tax revenues—approximately $40 million for the 1-cent-per-pound tax rate and
$100 million for the 1-percent rate.
No snack tax proposal includes detailed operation plans. Thus, our tabulations are lim-
ited. Some proposals suggest earmarking tax revenues for information programs, but
none have specified how they would try to convince consumers to make different
dietary choices. Our estimates of dietary impacts may, therefore, be incomplete.
Incompleteness does not mean our estimates are too low. We found that the lower tax
rates yield virtually no diet impacts. Adding an information program might increase
diet impacts, but that conclusion is far from certain. A short-term program that would
be widely used and offer long-term weight reduction has so far eluded the private sec-
tor despite huge financial incentives. Food advertisements on children’s television pro-
grams are repeated frequently, indicating that food manufacturers believe the effective-
ness of this information decays very rapidly. Hence, it is possible that a new program
would have no effect on diet quality. An information program with demonstrable
health benefits may need an entirely different approach in order to be effective.
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How Do Taxes Affect Food Markets?
By Patrick Canning (pcanning@ers.usda.gov) and 
Marinos Tsigas 
Several food market indicators would change if a flat income tax
system—that is, a system without exemptions, deductions, cred-
its, and deferrals—replaced the current system. Our findings
support the widely held view that even though a flat income tax
system would increase national income, gains for consumers
would be only modest. Nor would economic growth be univer-
sal. A federal flat tax structure would lead to smaller farm indus-
tries with lower than average growth rates, larger food industries
with higher than average growth rates, slightly lower food pro-
duction costs and consumer food prices, reduced net farm
exports, and reduced net food imports. If States were to enact
similar reforms, consumer food prices would drop 2.2 percent
overall and over 5 percent in the Delta, Appalachian, and South-




A Comparison of Vertical Coordination in 
the U.S. Poultry, Egg, and Pork Industries
By Steve W. Martinez (martinez@ers.usda.gov)
Changes in vertical coordination in the U.S. broiler, turkey, and
egg industries decades ago may provide useful insight into more
recent developments in the U.S. pork industry. The need to pro-
tect relationship-specific investments created incentives for con-
tracts and vertical integration. In the presence of relationship-
specific investments, market uncertainty from a number of




Consolidated Markets, Brand Competition,
and Orange Juice Prices
By James Binkley, Patrick Canning (pcanning@ers.usda.gov),
Ryan Dooley, and James Eales 
This paper examines how consolidation in the marketing system
affects prices for orange juice. We isolated the pricing behavior
of brand marketers, wholesalers, and retailers by observing the
retail prices for specific orange juice products, including leading
national brands and private label brands, in 54 U.S. markets over
a 1-year period. The data provided little compelling evidence
that consolidated markets engaged in non-competitive pricing
behavior. Increased brand competition, particularly between pri-
vate labels and leading national brands, did, however, appear to
lower average market prices.
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib747/aib74706.pdf
June 2002
Exploring Food Purchase Behavior of Low-Income
Households: How Do They Economize?
By Ephraim S. Leibtag (eleibtag@ers.usda.gov ) and Phil R.
Kaufman (pkaufman@ers.usda.gov )
This report compares food purchases by U.S. households of dif-
ferent income levels and finds that low-income shoppers spend
less on food purchases despite some evidence that they face gen-
erally higher purchase prices.  Households can economize on
food spending by purchasing more discounted products, favoring
private-label (generic) products over brand, pursuing volume dis-
counts, or settling for a less expensive product (for example, less
lean beef) within a product class.  A 1998 sample of foodstore
purchase data shows that low-income households adhere to these
practices when possible, but that the typically smaller size of
foodstores in urban and rural locations (compared with suburban
locations) may sometimes preclude them from doing so.
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib747/aib74707.pdf
June 2003